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1. SETUP
Informally, we want to design a measurement system such
that (1) a monitor can accurately estimate the loss and delay
performance of each network domain that participates in the
system, (2) a network domain cannot bias the measurement
process to its advantage without being detected, and (3) it
needs a reasonable, tunable amount of resources to partic-
ipate. We propose such a system, called Network Confes-
sional.
1.1 Terminology
A domain is a contiguous network that falls under one
administrative entity; in the current Internet, a domain would
refer to an edge network or a single Autonomous System
(AS).
A path is a sequence of nodes, where each node corre-
sponds to a border router of a domain, and the first and last
node belong to edge domains (Fig. 1).
With respect to a specific path, a node can be either an
input node (the even-numbered nodes in Fig. 1) or an out-
put node (the odd-numbered nodes in Fig. 1). Two consec-
utive nodes are peering, if they belong to adjacent domains
(e.g., nodes 1 and 2, or 3 and 4 in Fig. 1). The link between
two peering nodes i and j is faulty, if it introduces packet
loss, or reordering, or delay beyond a value ∆ij that is pre-
negotiated between the two nodes (e.g., is characteristic of
the link technology between them).
Each packet is associated with a specific path k, i.e., it is
forwarded along path k until it reaches the last node on k or
it is dropped. Given an input node i and an output node j
that comes after i on path k, we denote by λkij the amount
of packet loss experienced by path-k traffic between nodes
i and j; we denote by δkij(q) the q-th quantile of the delay
experienced by path-k traffic between i and j—for instance,
if δkij(95) = 10 msec, this means that 95% of the packets
from path k that traverse i and j, experience delay below 10
msec between i and j.
1.2 Problem Statement
Each path k is associated with an entity called a moni-
tor. Time is divided in fixed intervals, and at the end of each
interval the path-k monitor and all the path-k nodes partici-
pate in a measurement protocol. After running the protocol,
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for each input node i and output node j that comes after i
on path k, the path-k monitor computes an estimate of λkij ,
denoted by λ˜kij , and an estimate of δkij(q), denoted by δ˜kij(q).
We say that node i is correct with respect to (w.r.t.) path k,
if it participates in the measurement protocol with the path-
k monitor as specified. We say that node i is detectably
faulty w.r.t. path k, if it breaks the measurement protocol
in a way that affects a correct path-k node; the term “de-
tectably faulty” was introduced and formally defined in the
context of a distributed system in [11,12]. When a sequence
of nodes are detectably faulty w.r.t. path k, we call them ac-
complices w.r.t. path k. We say that node i is exposed to its
peering node j w.r.t. path k, if: node j is correct, node i is
detectably faulty and breaks the measurement protocol in a
way that affects j, and node j detects i’s behavior.
We want to design the measurement protocol, such that all
of the following conditions hold:
1. If nodes i and j are correct w.r.t. path k, then
|λ˜kij − λ
k
ij | < l
k
ij , |δ˜
k
ij − δ
k
ij | < d
k
ij w .p. pi
k
ij
The error margins, lkij and dkij , and the probability with
which they are honored, pikij , depend on (and can be
computed from) the rate of path-k traffic and node i’s
and node j’s configuration—in particular the amount
of memory and computing cycles used by the two nodes
to run the protocol.
2. If node i is detectably faulty w.r.t. path k, then some
accomplice of i is exposed w.r.t. path k to its peering
node.
3. If node i is correct w.r.t. all paths it participates in, it
does not need to maintain per-packet, per-flow, or per-
path state to run the protocol.
Figure 1: Circles represent administrative domains. The
numbered boxes represent border routers.
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All symbols mentioned above are summarized in Table 1.
For brevity, when it is obvious from the context that we are
referring to a particular path, we drop the superscript k from
λkij and δkij .
Discussion. The first condition ensures that a monitor can
estimate the performance of correct domains with proba-
bilistic guarantees. The second condition ensures that, if
a domain deviates from the protocol in a way that affects
another domain (e.g., makes its performance appear worse
than it is), then the misbehaving domain is exposed to the
affected domain. For instance, suppose that node 5 in Fig. 1
tries to hide the fact that X is dropping packets by making
it appear as if it delivers these packets to node 6; as long as
node 6 is correct, according to the third condition, domain N
will detect X’s misbehavior. The third condition—no per-
packet, per-flow or per-path state—is important, because a
node may observe hundreds of thousands, perhaps even mil-
lions of concurrent flows and paths.
1.3 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
(1) There exists a way for each node to reliably exchange
messages with a monitor, such that the authenticity and in-
tegrity of each received message is guaranteed. One way of
realizing this assumption would be for each domain to estab-
lish an HTTPS connection with the monitor. It is possible to
design more efficient dissemination mechanisms, but that is
outside the scope of this paper.
(2) There exists a way for each of two peering nodes to
debug the inter-domain link between them and determine
whether it is faulty.
(3) Nodes (whether correct or faulty) do not apply any
transformation to the observed traffic other than packet loss,
delay, or reordering. In particular, they do not inject new
packets or modify observed packets.
(4) Each node (border router or middlebox attached to a
border router) can perform at wire speed simple per-packet
operations. These include packet timestamp generation, arith-
metic calculations or digest computations on a small, fixed
portion of a packet, and modification of local state in a buffer.
2. WHY A NEW PROTOCOL
Instead of describing our protocol from scratch, we first
build, in this section, “obvious” solutions by extending ex-
isting techniques, and explain why these do not meet the
conditions of our problem statement. We close with a brief
overview of Network Confessional.
Packet Obituaries+. As a first-cut solution, we consider
the following modest extension to the Packet Obituaries pro-
tocol [3]. Each node computes a receipt for every observed
packet, which consists of a digest for the corresponding packet
and the timestamp for when the packet was observed. The
path-k monitor collects all the receipts computed by all the
path-k nodes; to estimate λkij , it counts how many path-k
packets were observed at node i versus node j; to estimate
δkij , it compares the timestamps recorded for the same packet
at node i versus node j. Moreover, the monitor determines
that peering nodes i and j are inconsistent w.r.t. a certain
packet, if: (1) node i computed a receipt for the packet,
and node j did not; (2) the difference in the two timestamps
recorded for this packet at nodes i and j exceeds a value ∆ij
pre-negotiated between the two nodes. When the monitor
detects such an inconsistency, it notifies both involved nodes
(hence, if the inconsistency is the result of one node being
detectably faulty, that node is exposed to its peering node).
This protocol fails to meet our third condition: it requires
storing, processing, and disseminating per-packet receipts,
leaving no room to a participating domain to choose (and
tune, according to network conditions) the amount of re-
sources it devotes to reporting its performance.
Coordinated Trajectory Sampling. Since the fundamen-
tal problem with Packet Obituaries+ is maintaining per-packet
state, the first solution that comes to mind is to sample, i.e.,
produce receipts not on all packets, but on a representative
subset, and use them to infer statistics for the rest. Hence,
we first consider the following simple combination of Packet
Obituaries and Trajectory Sampling [7] (POTS, for brevity).
Each node applies a uniform hash function to a small,
fixed portion of each observed packet; if the outcome is
equal to a pre-configured value, then the packet is sampled
and a receipt is computed for it (note that, since all nodes use
the same sampling function, they all sample the same pack-
ets). The path-k monitor collects all receipts computed by
all path-k nodes; it estimates the loss and delay experienced
by all packets, based on the loss and delay experienced by a
representative subset of sampled packets [17]; it determines
and reports inconsistencies on sampled packets as in Packet
Obituaries+.
This protocol fails to meet our first condition: it is possi-
ble that all nodes are correct, yet a monitor’s estimates are
arbitrarily inaccurate. In particular, each input node can en-
gage in the following behavior: for each observed packet,
determine whether the packet should be sampled and, if yes,
treat the packet preferentially, e.g., assign it to a high-priority
queue. I.e., the nodes bias the sampling process, such that
they tell the truth about what happens to the sampled pack-
ets, but that is not representative of what happens to the rest
of the traffic.
Note that, even if we modify POTS, such that domains
sample non-overlapping subsets of packets, domains can col-
lude, such that all of them treat all subsets of sampled pack-
ets preferentially. In this way, all nodes are correct, yet a
monitor’s estimates can still be arbitrarily inaccurate.
Verifiable Aggregation. An alternative to sampling is ag-
gregation: instead of computing receipts for sampled pack-
ets, compute receipts for packet aggregates. Hence, we next
consider a combination of Packet Obituaries and the Lossy
Difference Aggregator (LDA) [13]. Note that we could have
equally used the “Secure Sketch” technique from [10]—the
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Symbol Meaning
λkij Packet loss experienced by path-k traffic between
nodes i and j.
δkij(q) q-th quantile of delay experienced by path-k traffic
between nodes i and j.
lij Maximum estimation error incurred by path-k monitor
when estimating λkij .
dij Maximum estimation error incurred by path-k monitor
when estimating δkij(q).
piij Probability with which lij and dij are honored.
Table 1: Defined symbols.
conclusion would have been the same.
Each node divides the observed path-k traffic into “seg-
ments” (finite-length sequences of consecutively observed
packets), then divides packets from each segment into ag-
gregates based on their content (e.g., by applying a uniform
hash function to a small portion of each packet). It produces
a receipt for each aggregate in each segment, which consists
of an aggregate identifier, a packet count, and an average
timestamp. For simplicity, assume that all nodes produce
receipts on non-overlapping aggregates.
The path-k monitor collects all the receipts computed by
all path-k nodes; to estimate λkij , it counts the number of
packets observed at node i versus node j; to estimate δkij ,
it relies on the LDA technique (LDA does not estimate de-
lay quantiles, only average delay; however, one can imag-
ine an LDA extension, which would approximate the delay
distribution between the two nodes by combining average-
delay information from multiple aggregates). Moreover, the
monitor determines that peering nodes i and j are inconsis-
tent with respect to a segment, if: node i reported observing
more packets from that segment than node j, or the differ-
ence in the two average timestamps recorded for this seg-
ment at nodes i and j exceeds a value ∆ij pre-negotiated
between the two nodes. When the monitor detects such an
inconsistency, it notifies both involved nodes.
This protocol fails to meet our third condition: it requires
maintaining per-aggregate state (and recall that there exist
multiple aggregates per path). This is a fundamental lim-
itation of aggregation-based solutions—to produce receipts
on aggregates, nodes have to collect per-aggregate statistics,
which requires maintaining at least one record per active ag-
gregate, on fast memory that can be updated at line speed.
Our Solution. We employ sampling, but in a way that is
not susceptible to bias. Our solution shares elements with
Trajectory Sampling (nodes produce receipts for a subset of
observed packets and choose which packets to sample using
hash functions), but prevents sampling bias in the following
way: the sampling function is keyed on future traffic, mak-
ing the samples unpredictable. Specifically, a domain does
not know whether it will have to report measurements on a
particular packet until after it has forwarded that packet to its
downstream neighbor. As a result, an unscrupulous domain
has no way to decide whether to “sugarcoat” its performance
by preferentially treating particular packets. The challenge
is implementing this idea in a practical manner, i.e., without
requiring the source to explicitly signal to all the other nodes
which packets to sample, in accordance to the memory and
computing requirements dictated by our third condition, and
with per-domain tunability.
3. BASIC OPERATION
We now describe the basic elements of Network Confes-
sional. For simplicity, we assume, in this section, that all
nodes have synchronized clocks and that there is no ambigu-
ity regarding the path followed by a packet (i.e., when a node
observes a packet, it knows which path this packet is associ-
ated with). We relax these assumptions in the next section.
3.1 Node Operation
Each node samples a subset of the packets it observes
and generates a receipt for each sampled packet. A receipt
has form R = 〈ReporterID , ReporterConfig , PacketID ,
Time, NeighborID , ∆〉. ReporterID is the identity of the
reporting node and ReporterConfig a specification of its
sampling function (more on this later). PacketID is a digest
of the packet’s headers and a small portion of its content.
Time specifies when the packet was observed. NeighborID
is the identity of the node that is peering with the reporter
on the path where the packet belongs. ∆ is a value agreed
upon between the reporter and the neighbor; it is meant to
lower-bound the difference in timestamps one should expect
between the two nodes.
Instead of sampling packets in real time, each node col-
lects state on all observed packets, but only for a fixed, short
period of time (milliseconds or so). The node is periodi-
cally told which of the stored per-packet state to keep and
which to discard. Since a domain learns whether a packet’s
fate will affect estimates of its performance only after it has
forwarded that packet, it cannot treat sampled packets pref-
erentially.
A key question is who tells each node which packets to
sample. One approach would be to use explicit signaling;
for example, in Fig. 1, domain S could explicitly tell all
nodes which packets to sample from the packet stream sent
from S to D, as in the PAAI-1 packet-dropping adversary
identification protocol [18]. In our context, however, that ap-
proach would be naı¨ve, because it would require each source
domain to actively probe all Internet paths through which
it sends traffic; it would also require each node to imple-
ment fine-granularity per-packet timers. Instead, each node
decides whether to sample a packet based on the contents
of another packet observed later. In this sense, domain S
implicitly dictates which of its packets should be sampled,
through the traffic it sends out subsequently.
More specifically, each node maintains a circular buffer,
where it stores a tuple (path ID, packet ID, and timestamp)
for the β most recently observed packets. Alg. 1 shows what
happens when a node observes a new packet p. First, the
node computes a tuple Tp for the new packet (line 1). Then,
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Algorithm 1 ProcessPacket(packet p)
PathID(packet) packet’s path
PacketID(packet) hash function
MarkerID(packet) hash function
Hash(packet1, packet2) hash function
µ marking threshold
σ sampling threshold
Buffer circular buffer
Initially Buffer ← ∅
1: Tp ← 〈PathID(p),PacketID(p),Time〉
2: if MarkerID(p) < µ then
3: for all T in Buffer do
4: if T.PathID = Tp.PathID then
5: if Hash(T.PacketID , Tp.PacketID) < σ then
6: Copy T for dissemination
7: Remove T from Buffer
8: Copy Tp for dissemination
9: else
10: Add Tp to Buffer
if the packet satisfies a certain condition, it is chosen as a
“marker” packet (line 2). In that case, its contents determine
which of the β most recently observed packets to sample
(lines 3–5); only packets from the same path with the marker
packet can be sampled (line 4). The tuples of the chosen
packets are copied for later dissemination (line 6). All tu-
ples that correspond to packets from the same path with the
marker are removed from the buffer (line 7). The marker
packet itself is also sampled (line 8). If the new packet is not
chosen as a marker, its tuple is added to the circular buffer
(lines 9, 10).
The parameters of the algorithm are: the size of the cir-
cular buffer β, the marking threshold µ, which determines
which packets are markers (line 2), and the sampling thresh-
old σ, which determines which of the tuples in the circular
buffer to sample (line 5). Moreover, MarkerID(p) is a func-
tion that provides uniform hashing between 0 and some max-
imum valueM, while Hash (PacketID(p1), PacketID(p2))
provides uniform hashing between 0 and some maximum
value S .
Lemma 3.1. Consider a path that forms a fraction pip of
the total traffic observed by a node. If the node uses Alg. 1,
it samples each packet from that path with probability
pis =
(
1−
(
1− pip
µ
M
)β)
·
σ
S
(1)
PROOF. An observed packet p is sampled when: (1) p’s
tuple is still in the circular buffer when the next marker m
from the same path arrives and (2) Hash (PacketID(p),
PacketID(m)) < σ. We first compute the probability of
event (1). Consider an observed packet p that is not chosen
as a marker. Each of the packets observed after p is from the
same path with p and is chosen as a marker with probability
pip
µ
M
. Hence, the number of packets observed between p
and m (we call it the “distance” between p and m) is a ran-
dom variable with geometric distribution and success rate
pip
µ
M
. It follows that the probability that Distance(p,m) <
β is equal to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the geometric distribution, i.e., 1 −
(
1− pip
µ
M
)β
. Next, we
compute the probability of event (2) given event (1). Given
that p’ tuple is still in the circular buffer when m arrives, p
is sampled with probability σ
S
. Hence, packet p is sampled
with probability
(
1−
(
1− pip
µ
M
)β)
· σ
S
.
Eq. 1 says that, as long as β  M
µ
· 1
pip
, then pis ≈ σS ,
i.e., a node samples each observed packet p with the same
probability σ
S
, independently from which path p is associ-
ated with, and independently from the size of the circular
buffer β. Intuitively, as long as the circular buffer is large
enough that a packet p’s tuple is always in the buffer when
the next marker from the same path with p is observed, then
the size of the circular buffer β does not affect which packets
are sampled. For the rest of this section, we will assume that
this is the case. In Section 4.1, we will see how to choose
the various parameters of the system to make this hold.
The marking threshold µ is a system-wide constant, com-
mon for all nodes; hence, all nodes on a certain path select
the same packets as marker packets for that path (modulo
loss). In contrast, the sampling threshold σ is a local pa-
rameter, chosen independently at each node. If all nodes on
a certain path choose the same σ, they all sample the same
packets from that path (modulo loss and reordering). We
turn next to what happens when different nodes select differ-
ent σ.
3.2 Tunability
Each node chooses its own sampling threshold σ. At the
same time, given any number of nodes and their sampling
thresholds, we maximize the number of packets that are com-
monly sampled by all nodes on the same path. The key el-
ement that enables this property is the inequality in line 5
of Alg. 1. Consider nodes 1 and 2, with different sampling
thresholds σ1 and σ2 > σ1. Suppose there is no packet loss
or reordering between the two nodes; p is a packet sampled
by node 1, and m is the first marker from the same path with
p, observed after p. Since node 1 samples p, this necessarily
means thatHash(PacketID(p),PacketID(m))< σ1 < σ2,
which means that node 2 also samples p.
So, even though each node chooses its sampling thresh-
old σ independently, if there is no packet loss or reordering
between two nodes on the same path, the node with bigger
σ will sample at least all the packets from that path sampled
by the node with smaller σ.
3.3 Monitor Operation and Statistics
At the end of each time interval, the path-k monitor col-
lects all the receipts produced by path-k nodes. We now
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consider the monitor associated with the path in Fig. 1 and
describe how it estimates and verifies the performance of do-
main X over a given time interval.
Loss Estimation. For brevity, we define λ = λ45. For
simplicity, we first assume that there is no packet reorder-
ing within domain X , i.e., packets that are not lost between
nodes 4 and 5 are observed at the two nodes in the same
order. We will remove this assumption later.
The monitor considers the receipts R4 and R5 generated
by the two nodes during the given time interval. By looking
at the ReporterConfig values of these receipts, it divides the
time interval into sub-intervals, such that, throughout each
sub-interval, each node used a constant sampling threshold.
For each sub-interval, it counts the number of packets K
that were sampled by node 4 and should have been sam-
pled by both nodes, i.e., all packets p that: (1) were sampled
by node 4 based on a marker m that was also observed at
node 5 and (2) satisfy Hash(PacketID(p), PacketID(m))
< σmin , where σmin is the smaller sampling threshold used
by the two nodes. Of these K packets, it counts the number
of packets k that were not sampled by node 5 and estimates
the loss rate λ between the two nodes as λ˜ = k
K
.
Now assume that there is some packet reordering between
the two nodes. As above, the receipt collector first counts
the number of packets K that were sampled by node 4 and
should have been sampled by both nodes and, of these, the
number of packets k that were not sampled by node 5. Of
these k packets, let’s say that kl were lost between nodes 4
and 5, while kr = k− kl were reordered with their previous
or next marker such that node 5 did observe them but did
not sample them. Hence, to accurately estimate the loss rate
between the two nodes (as kl
K
), the receipt collector would
need to know kl or kr.
Fortunately, there is a simple way around this problem.
Packet reordering caused node 5 not to sample kr packets
that it would have sampled otherwise, but it also caused node
5 to sample k¯r packets that it would not have sampled, had
there been no reordering. Assuming that the probability of
two packets being reordered depends only on the distance
between them [8], then kr and k¯r should be statistically the
same. The receipt collector does not know kr (it is masked
by the kl packets that were lost between the two nodes), but
it does know k¯r; it is the number of packets p that: (1) were
not sampled by node 4, (2) were sampled by node 5 based on
a marker m that was also observed at node 4, and (3) satisfy
Hash(PacketID(p),PacketID(m)) < σmin . Hence, the
receipt collector computes k¯r and estimates the loss rate λ
between the two nodes as λ˜ = k−k¯r
K
, i.e., it approximates kr
with k¯r.
Lemma 3.2. The expected value of the estimate is λ. The
relative standard deviation is√
1− λ
N pis λ
+
2 pir(1− pir)
N pis λ2
(2)
where all the parameters are specified in Table 2.
Parameter Meaning
λ Actual loss rate (that we are trying to estimate).
N Number of packets observed at node 4 during the
given sub-period before a marker m that was also
observed at node 5.
pis Probability that a packet is sampled, given by Eq. 1.
pir Probability that a packet is reordered with its marker
and observed at node 5 but not sampled by it.
Table 2: Parameters for Lemma 3.2.
PROOF. In the appendix.
Once we know the standard deviation of the estimate, it is
straightforward to compute its maximum distance from the
actual loss with a given probability pi [16].
Lemma 3.2 tells us that packet reordering does not prevent
us from estimating λ correctly, however, it does increase the
relative standard deviation of our estimate. The relative stan-
dard deviation depends on the average number of sampled
packets that we use to produce the estimate (N pis in Eq. 2):
the better (lower) the relative standard deviation that we want
to achieve, the more samples (receipts on sampled packets)
we need to collect. To give some concrete numbers, sup-
pose that λ = 5%, and we want to estimate it with a relative
standard deviation of 0.1. According to Eq. 2, if there is no
packet reordering (pir = 0), we can produce a new estimate
every time we have collected receipts on N pis = 1900 new
packets; if there is packet reordering, such that pir = 10%
of the packets that should be sampled by node 5 miss their
marker and are not sampled, then we can produce an esti-
mate every time we have collected receipts on N pis = 9100
new packets. Assuming a traffic rate of 100 Mbps, a sam-
pling rate of pis = 1%, and about 400 bytes/packet, 1900
sampled packets correspond to 7 seconds, while 9100 pack-
ets correspond to 30 seconds. So, packet reordering forces
us to estimate loss rate at longer intervals in order to achieve
a given level of accuracy.
Delay Estimation. The receipt collector considers all the
receipts generated by nodes 4 and 5 during a given time pe-
riod. By looking at the PacketID of these receipts, it de-
termines the set of packets that were commonly sampled by
the two nodes. By comparing the Time reported by the two
nodes for each commonly sampled packet, it computes the
delay incurred by the packet within X . Finally, by combin-
ing the delay incurred by multiple packets, it estimates the
maximum delay incurred by q% of the packets, by using the
algorithm proposed in [17]. That algorithm takes as input (1)
the delays incurred by all sampled packets, (2) the quantile
q we are interested in, and (3) a probability pi, and outputs a
lower and upper bound, such that the actual delay value we
are estimating falls between the two bounds with probability
pi.
Verification. The monitor considers all the receipts gen-
erated by each pair of peering nodes i and j during the given
time interval. Then it identifies the set of packets that were
sampled by node i and should have been sampled by both
nodes (we explained how this is achieved in the “Loss Es-
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timation” paragraph above). The monitor determines that
nodes i and j are consistent with respect to a packet p, if:
(1) Either both or none of them provide a receipt on p. (2)
If both nodes provide receipts on p (say, Ri(p) and Rj(p)),
then:
Ri(p).∆ = Rj(p).∆
Ri(p).Time −Rj(p).Time ≤ Rj(p).∆
These rules express the fact that a correct inter-domain link
does not introduce loss or unpredictable delay. If two peer-
ing nodes are not consistent with respect to any packet, the
monitor reports the inconsistency to both of them.
This means that, as long as peering nodes i and j use the
same sampling threshold (hence, are expected to sample the
same packets), if node i is not correct (i.e., tries to blame its
problems on j), while node j is correct, that will necessar-
ily lead to an inconsistency and expose i to j. However, if
node i uses a larger sampling threshold (hence, is expected
to sample more packets) then node i is free to lie about the
packets that should be sampled by i but not by j. In short,
the monitor can verify X’s performance, only based on the
packets that are expected to be commonly sampled by X and
its neighbors.
4. ANALYSIS
Network Confessional tries to (1) prevent nodes from bi-
asing their sampling and (2) maximize the number of pack-
ets commonly sampled by all nodes. We now look at how it
reacts when node behavior undermines these two goals.
4.1 Delayed Forwarding
Consider an input node on path k, which tries to cheat in
the following way: it briefly stores each path-k packet before
forwarding it, in case the next path-k marker arrives soon
enough for the node to determine whether the packet needs
be sampled and treat it accordingly. In this way, the node
manages to treat a fraction of the sampled path-k packets
preferentially, hence exaggerate its domain’s performance
w.r.t. path k.
To prevent domains from exaggerating their performance
in this way, the path-k monitor can discard any receipt pro-
duced by a node i, if the receipt corresponds to a packet
observed within a time interval τ before the next marker (at
node i). E.g., by choosing τ = 100 msec, the monitor en-
sures that, to learn that a packet needs to be sampled and treat
it preferentially and get away with it, a node would have to
first delay that packet by at least 100 msec.
The question then is, what fraction of the collected path-k
receipts does the monitor get to keep? The answer is equal
to the probability that a path-k packet is not observed within
an interval τ before the next path-k marker:
φ =
(
1−
µ
M
)rate×τ
(3)
where rate is the packet rate of path k. Intuitively, the higher
the frequency of markers, µ
M
, and the higher the packet rate
of path k, the more path-k packets are observed time-wise
close to the next path-k marker, hence the more the receipts
that the path-k monitor has to discard.
We want the fraction φ of valid (non-discarded) receipts to
be non-negligible, but we cannot achieve that for all packet
rates: for a given minimum fraction φ and a given frequency
of markers, µ
M
, there exists a maximum packet rate that path
k must honor in order for the path-k monitor to collect a non-
negligible number of receipts and compute accurate statis-
tics for the path. Differently said, the value of the marking
threshold µ determines the maximum packet rate for which
the monitors can compute accurate statistics. For example,
assuming τ = 100 msec and φ = 10%, if µ
M
= 0.00009,
then our system supports a maximum per-path packet rate
of 250 000 packets/sec (about 1 Gbps, assuming 500-byte
packets).
At the same time, as argued in Section 3.1, path k must
contribute a minimum fraction of the packets observed at
each node i in order for the path-k monitor to compute ac-
curate statistics for the path: from Eq. 1, if the probability of
a packet observed at node i belonging to path k is pip, node
i must use β  M
µ
· 1
pip
in order for our analysis of Sec-
tion 3.3 to hold. Differently said, given a marking threshold
µ, the circular buffer size β used by node i determines the
minimum pip for which the monitors can compute accurate
statistics. For example, given µ
M
= 0.00009, if node i uses
β = 5000 000 tuples, then our system supports a minimum
pip = 0.02 for node i.
To summarize, the value of the marking threshold µ and
the circular buffer sizes used by the path-k nodes determine
the minimum and maximum packet rate that path k must
honor so that the corresponding monitor can compute accu-
rate statistics for the path. The next question then is, what
are reasonable values for today’s networks? Table 3 shows
the range of per-path rates that our system supports for dif-
ferent marker frequencies µ
M
, assuming a circular buffer that
can fit β = 5 million tuples. The minimum pip is computed
such that β  M
µ
· 1
pip
. The minimum rate is computed from
pip, assuming a saturated OC-192 network interface, i.e., a
bit rate of 10 Gbps or a packet rate of 2.5 million packets
per second.1 The maximum rate in packets per second is
computed from Eq. 3, for τ = 100 msec and φ = 10%; it is
converted to Mbps assuming 500-byte packets.
Table 3 shows that we are facing a resource challenge.
We show numbers for β = 5 million tuples, because that
corresponds to a few MB of memory, which can fit within
a single SRAM chip, making our system easier to imple-
ment. Ideally, we would want to use one such small buffer
per node, even for nodes that correspond to OC-192 inter-
faces. However, doing so, would not allow us to cover a
large enough range of per-path packet rates—we could cover
only one of the four ranges stated in the table, which would
1We assume a saturated OC-192 interface in order to be conserva-
tive. If we assume a lower-rate and/or under-utilized interface, we
cover a larger range for the same parameter values.
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τ = 100 msec, φ = 10%, β = 5 million tuples
µ
M
Min pip
Min rate, OC-192 Max rate
pps (Mbps) pps (Mbps)
0.00009 0.02 50 000 (200) 250 000 (1000)
0.00045 0.004 10 000 (40) 50 000 (200)
0.0022 0.0008 2000 (8) 10 000 (40)
0.01 0.00018 450 (1.8) 2000 (8)
Table 3: Range of supported per-path rates.
not be enough. On the other hand, to cover the four ranges
with a single buffer, we would need β = 500 million tu-
ples (β  1
0.00009
· 1
0.00018
), i.e., hundreds of memory chips,
which would make our system practically infeasible.
The solution to this resource challenge is to use multiple
buffers, each with different parameters, for each node. In
particular, each node has N circular buffers, each operating
with a different marking threshold; when a new packet is
observed at the node, the node runs Alg. 1 for each different
circular buffer, i.e., each observed packet causes the node
to change the state of all the circular buffers. However, in
the end, each buffer yields accurate statistics for a different
set of paths. For example, to cover all the four ranges of
Table 3, we need to use N = 4 circular buffers per OC-192
interface, each buffer corresponding to one row of the table
and covering the corresponding per-path packet-rate range.
4.2 Other Adversarial Behavior
Deliberate Marker Loss. An under-performing domain
(say X in Fig. 1) may drop all marker packets, causing the
next domain (N , in our example) to not sample any packets,
in order to ensure that X’s performance is never verified ac-
cording to N ’s receipts or simply to make N look bad. Such
behavior is necessarily exposed, because all marker packets
must be sampled. If X drops a marker m, it either has to
admit dropping it, or lie and be inconsistent with N ’s report
that it never received m. So, if X consistently drops marker
packets, it either admits it and is globally exposed as under-
performing and misbehaving, or blames the losses on N and
is exposed to N as a liar.
Packet Crafting. Network Confessional was not designed
to resist attacks where domains deliberately inject or modify
packets (Section 1), however, we do discuss what happens
when it encounters such behavior. Suppose domain X mod-
ifies an observed packet p or, equivalently, drops p and in-
troduces a new packet q in its place. Let’s first assume that q
has a different packet ID from p. There are several cases: (1)
p is sampled, in which case, node 4 produces a receipt on p,
but node 5 does not, hence X appears to have dropped p. (2)
q is sampled, in which case, X appears to have introduced
a new packet. (3) Neither packet is sampled, in which case,
X’s behavior does not impact its receipts. So, it is possible
for X to modify a few packets and get away with it. How-
ever, if it consistently engages in such behavior, given that it
cannot predict which packets will be sampled, it will even-
tually have to report on one of the modified packets, and its
behavior will be exposed. On the other hand, if X can craft q
such that it has the same packet ID with p, then its behavior
does not impact its receipts at all. We believe that we can de-
fend against such attacks by making it hard to craft packets
with a given packet ID, but we defer this to future work.
Now suppose domain X modifies the TTL field of the IP
header of an observed packet p, such that p is dropped within
domain N ; as a result, N appears (based on its receipts) to
be under-performing. Network Confessional cannot detect
such malicious behavior, and it is not meant to; it is meant to
detect where packets are dropped or delayed, and this is pre-
cisely what it does in this case, even if the reason for the drop
is not really N ’s fault. Of course, if X consistently engages
in such behavior, N will eventually detect that it is drop-
ping packets, investigate the problem, and trace it back to
X delivering packets with low TTL. In this sense, Network
Confessional does exactly what it is meant to—detect packet
loss and unpredictable delay and alert the involved domains;
how each domain responds and investigates depends on its
policy.
5. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We now relax the assumptions made in Section 3—that
all nodes must have perfectly synchronized clocks and that
there is no ambiguity regarding the path followed by each
observed packet.
Clock Synchronization. Network Confessional does not
dictate any particular clock-synchronization policy. How-
ever, it is to each participating domain’s best interest to keep
its reporting nodes (its border routers) reasonably synchro-
nized, since the domain’s delay performance will be esti-
mated based on the timestamps reported by these nodes. More-
over, it is to two neighboring domains’ best interest to keep
peering nodes reasonably synchronized, otherwise their times-
tamp difference will exceed the reported ∆, and the two
neighbors will generate inconsistent reports (hence appear
to have a problematic inter-domain link or be involved in a
lie). We should clarify that domains are free to report arbi-
trarily large ∆ values: nothing prevents nodes 3 and 4 from
reporting a ∆ of seconds between them, hence not needing
to synchronize their clocks beyond that granularity. How-
ever, that does make it look like they are connected through
an awfully slow inter-domain link—not a good feature to ad-
vertise to their customers and peers.
So, what is a reasonable granularity at which a domain
should keep its border routers synchronized? Since typical
intra-domain latency is on the order of tens of milliseconds,
a granularity of a few milliseconds is sufficient. This is re-
portedly achievable with NTP [5]. But if NTP is not deemed
sufficiently reliable, a domain can equip its border routers
with radio or GPS receivers [1], currently costing $200 a
piece—a negligible cost compared to that of a border router.
Mapping Packets to Paths. In reality, a node cannot
know the path followed by each observed packet, so it clas-
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Figure 2: Domain S load-balances traffic with the same
source and destination prefix across two inter-domain
paths.
sifies packets per {source prefix, destination prefix} pair,
where “prefix” is the origin prefix of the corresponding IP
address as obtained through BGP, such that all domains that
observe a packet p derive the same prefix pair for the packet.
This has no implication for us when all packets with the
same source and destination prefix follow the same path;
otherwise, it requires a straightforward extension that we
describe next. We should clarify that this extension is not
needed by domains that apply the common types of load-
balancing. For instance, domains can load-balance traffic
per destination prefix or source/destination prefix across mul-
tiple inter-domain paths without the extension. It is only
needed by domains that load-balance traffic with the same
source and destination prefix across different inter-domain
paths; we are not aware of ISPs engaging in such load-balancing,
but there is no way to verify that they do not.
First, we explain why load-balancing traffic with the same
PathID across multiple inter-domain paths is problematic
for Network Confessional. Consider the scenario depicted
in Figure 2. Suppose node 1 observes packet sequence 〈p1,
p2, p3, p4,m1, p5, p6, p7, p8, m2〉 and samples packets p1, p4
based on marker m1 and packets p5, p8 based on marker
m2. Now suppose that node 1 load-balances the observed se-
quence across nodes 2a and 2b, such that 2a observes packet
sequence 〈p1, p3,m1, p6, p8〉 and samples packet p1 based
on marker m1, while 2b observes packet sequence 〈p2, p4,
p5, p7,m2〉 and samples packets p2, p5 based on marker m2.
So, load-balancing has a similar effect to packet reordering:
First, some packets are sampled at L’s entry point and suc-
cessfully delivered to the next domain(s), yet not sampled
by any of its exit points (packets p4 and p8); we say that
these packets were downgraded. Second, some packets are
not sampled at L’s entry point, yet are sampled at one of
its exit points (packet p2); we way that these packets were
upgraded. As a result, a receipt collector cannot just count
how many packets were sampled at L’s entry point but not at
its exit points as lost, because that would over-estimate L’s
loss.
We now describe how a receipt collector estimates L’s
loss during a certain time period. In a nutshell, it performs
the same trick that we used to deal with packet reorder-
ing (Section 3.3), i.e., leverages the fact that the number of
downgraded and upgraded packets should be statistically the
same in order to estimate the number of downgraded pack-
ets and subtract it from the loss estimate. More specifically:
Without loss of generality, we assume that during the given
time period, nodes 1, 2a, and 2b use the same buffer size
β and the same sampling threshold σ. The receipt collector
performs the following operations: (1) It counts the num-
ber of packets K that were sampled at L’s entry and should
have been sampled at L’s exit (all packets p that were sam-
pled by node 1 based on a marker m that was also observed
at either node 2a or node 2b). (2) Of these K packets, it
counts the number of packets k that were not sampled at L’s
exit. These are the packets that were either lost in L or were
“downgraded” due to load-balancing. (3) It counts the num-
ber of packets k¯ that were sampled at L’s exit but not at L’s
entry. These are the packets that were “upgraded” due to
load-balancing. (4) It estimates the loss rate λ as λ∗ = k−k¯
K
.
A similar approach is used to estimate N ’s loss rate.
The accuracy of this estimate is exactly the one given by
Lemma 3.2, with the difference that pir is now the proba-
bility that a packet misses its marker due to either packet
reordering or load-balancing.
Privacy. We will now argue informally that external ob-
servers can see no more internal information about a domain
with Network Confessional than they can see today without
it. We acknowledge that privacy deserves a fuller, formal
analysis, but defer that to future work.
First, we consider the “privacy perimeter” lying around
a single participating domain, i.e., consider whether Net-
work Confessional exposes to the outside world any infor-
mation that was previously exclusively known to the domain.
Our privacy argument is based on the content of traffic re-
ceipts. The two receipt fields directly dependent on traffic
are PacketID and Time, both of which can be filled in by
the domain’s neighbor transmitting packets to or receiving
packets from the domain. ReporterID , NeighborID , and
∆ are already known to the corresponding neighbors, hence
leak no information that was previously exclusively known
to the domain.
Next, we consider the privacy perimeter lying around a
pair of neighboring domains. As described in Section 3.1,
traffic receipts do reveal some information that would oth-
erwise remain private between the two neighbors: the num-
ber of peering points (as exposed via distinct ReporterID’s
and NeighborID’s), as well as the expected delay imposed
by the inter-domain links (as exposed via ∆). However, in
practice, two neighbors can easily conceal both types of in-
formation from outsiders. First, they can conceal the number
of peering points by using a single pair of ReporterID and
NeighborID in traffic receipts. They can also conceal the
actual delay of links in a similar fashion, as follows. They
can agree to “absorb” the latency of the inter-domain link
into their own intra-domain latencies. For instance, consider
nodes 5 and 6 from Fig. 1 and assume the latency of the link
between them is 1 msec. Instead of reporting ∆ = 1 msec,
the two nodes report ∆ ≈ 0. When node 5 observes packet
p at time t1, it reports observing it at time t1 + 0.5 msec;
similarly, when node 6 observes packet p at time t2, it re-
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ports observing it at time t2 − 0.5 msec. In this way, the
latency of the inter-domain link is hidden from the outside
world and “charged” equally to the two domains. Note that
this does not affect in any way the capability of Network
Confessional to detect and expose lies.
Partial Deployment. Partial deployment is still beneficial
to the participating domains. Even if X is the only domain
on a certain path that has deployed Network Confessional,
its performance reports may not be verified by its neigh-
bors, but they are still verifiable. So, during a congestion
incident, X can still position itself as the “good” ISP that
provides troubleshooting information to its customers—it is
not its fault that the other ISPs on the path are not up to
the task. X can even use this as an incentive to encour-
age multi-network customers to connect all their networks
through X—since that way they avoid domains that do not
provide troubleshooting information.
Incentives. If domain X has not deployed Network Con-
fessional, but its neighbors have, then X’s neighbors are
free to blame their performance problems on X (since X
does not produce any receipts to refute their claims). Conse-
quently, the fault localization properties of Network Confes-
sional are provided only at the granularity of deployment—
informally, the sub-graph of the domain topology whose ver-
tices are participating domains and whose edges link par-
ticipating domains only over domain paths that include no
participating domain in the topology. On the other hand,
the loss of fault-localization resolution due to partial deploy-
ment can be viewed as an incentive for adoption: a domain
has to report on its performance in order to prevent its neigh-
bors from blaming their problems on it undetected.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
Hardware Implementation. We now outline one possi-
ble implementation of Network Confessional that requires
an SRAM buffer and a small TCAM (ternary content ad-
dressable memory) chip per linecard. TCAM is already widely
used in routers for storing forwarding and filtering tables, in
general, any state that needs to be accessed at line rate. It
is appropriate for such applications, because it can access
in parallel all the entries of a stored table and return any
matches within a few nanoseconds, independently of the ta-
ble’s size.
Each node uses two circular buffers per linecard: one for
marker packets, stored in TCAM, and one for non-marker
packets, stored in SRAM. Upon receiving a packet p, the
node determines whether p is a marker packet, creates for it
a 〈PathID , PacketID , Time〉 tuple, and adds it to the head
of the marker or non-marker buffer, accordingly. In paral-
lel, a separate process reads tuples from the tail of the non-
marker buffer and determines whether each tuple Tp should
be kept or discarded, as follows. First, it reads Tp.PathID
and Tp.Time , and identifies the corresponding marker tuple:
it uses the TCAM search capabilities to identify all tuples T ′
in the marker buffer with T ′.PathID = Tp.PathID , deletes
any tuple with T ′.Time < Tp.Time from the marker buffer,
and chooses the marker tuple T with the smallest times-
tamp that also satisfies T.Time > Tp.Time . Then, if Hash
(T.PacketID , Tp.PacketID) < σ, it copies Tp elsewhere
for later dissemination, otherwise, it discards Tp.
The feasibility and cost of this implementation are de-
termined by the sizes of the two buffers. The non-marker
buffer must have size β chosen based on the analysis of
Section 4.1. The marker buffer must have size significantly
larger than µ
M
β, so that the probability of an overflow (i.e.,
that a marker tuple is deleted before it is used) is negligible.
For instance, for µ
M
= 0.01, we need a non-marker buffer
that can store around 1 million tuples and a marker buffer
that can store around 0.1 million tuples.
Receipt Overhead. Each router that supports Network
Confessional must periodically extract the sampled state from
its data-path and export it in the form of receipts, akin to
how a NetFlow-enabled router periodically extracts NetFlow
records from its data-path and exports them to a management
server for processing. The amount of memory, processing,
and bandwidth required for this operation is directly propor-
tional to the rate at which the router produces receipts, i.e.,
its sampling rate. This can be locally tuned to match the
router’s resources by changing the sampling threshold σ.
We have said that each domain makes each receipt avail-
able to every other domain that observed the corresponding
traffic. Whether this happens pro-actively (through a con-
stant receipt stream) or on-demand (e.g., through a secure
web interface), receipt dissemination introduces, in each path,
bandwidth overhead that depends on (1) the number of bor-
der routers on that path and (2) the rate at which each of
these routers produces receipts. This may seem, at first,
to be cause for concern—one could argue that introducing
bandwidth overhead that grows with the total number of bor-
der routers per path is not a scalable approach. In practice,
this is not a problem: Paths consist on average of 3–4 do-
mains (hence 4–6 border routers), while most paths consist
of fewer than 6 domains (10 border routers) [2]. Consider a
6-domain path, where each border router samples 1% of the
path’s packets. Assuming 20 bytes per receipt, this path will
incur an overhead of 2 bytes per packet; assuming 400 bytes
per packet, this leads to a 0.5% bandwidth overhead.
Software Implementation. As a proof of concept, we
implemented Alg. 1 in Click, configured an eight-core Intel
Nehalem server as a standard IPv4 router, and fed to it a real
trace. Then we measured the router’s performance with and
without running Alg. 1 and saw no difference (in both cases,
the server routed 25Gbps). This is not surprising, given that,
when fed realistic traffic, a Nehalem server is bottlenecked
at the I/O [6], whereas our algorithm burdens the CPU.
In our implementation, we computed the PathID of each
packet as the concatenation of its source and destination ori-
gin prefixes. We implemented the MarkerID and PacketID
functions using the “Bob” hash function with different seeds,
because it has been shown to work well with Internet traf-
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fic [15]. Given that the CAIDA traces do not include the full
payload of the captured packets, we applied the two func-
tions only to the IP header (modulo the TTL field) and the
small portion of the payload that is included—typically 20
bytes of TCP headers. Our results show that this is suffi-
cient, i.e., our implementation indeed collects a random sam-
ple from each path, with the sampling rate given by Eq. 1.
7. RELATED WORK
The idea of delayed disclosure of a secret—the sampling
seed—has appeared before in networked systems. In the
closest related work (which was developed in parallel with
our own) Zhang et al. [18] describe a taxonomy of schemes
that enable a trusted source/destination pair to identify on-
path network adversaries that are maliciously dropping pack-
ets. In one of these schemes (PAAI-1), delayed disclosure
comes in the form of an explicit request from the source to
all the nodes on the path identifying a packet that should
be acknowledged. First, that work targets a stronger adver-
sarial model (adversaries who may modify or inject pack-
ets) but relies on stronger assumptions as well: symmetric
traffic paths and application-layer processing of all receipts
by all nodes on a path (onion cryptography). In contrast,
Network Confessional makes no claim about the path tra-
versed by receipts to collectors and requires processing only
by the issuer of a receipt. Second, PAAI-1 requires that
the source generates explicit signaling in addition to nor-
mal traffic and that all nodes implement fine-granularity, per-
packet timers. In contrast, Network Confessional requires no
explicit signaling—using instead later traffic to derive late-
disclosed secrets—and a common circular buffer per node
without any associated timers. At a higher level, the work
by Zhang et al. concerns a usage model that requires end
points (e.g., the source and the destination) to be intimately
involved implementing functionality such as end-to-end re-
ceipts, whereas our approach could be implemented locally,
only within a short sub-path of an end-to-end path; and all
domains must participate equally to the monitoring scheme,
whereas local tunability is an explicit, fundamental require-
ment of Network Confessional.
The Packet Obituaries protocol [3] and the fault-localization
protocols from [9] inform traffic sources where individual
packets get lost or corrupted. AudIt provides source do-
mains with similar per-TCP-flow information [4]. Network
Confessional is similar to these protocols in that it relies on
in-path elements collecting and exporting traffic statistics;
it also borrows the concept of report consistency from Au-
dIt. However, unlike these protocols, Network Confessional
avoids the overheads necessary for collecting and propagat-
ing per-packet or per-flow state, while maintaining the veri-
fiability property.
In Trajectory Sampling, routers within an ISP sample pack-
ets using a hash function and record their digests, with the
purpose of inferring the internal paths (sequences of routers)
followed by packets [7]. The Lossy Difference Aggregator
enables two monitoring points to measure the loss and aver-
age delay between them by maintaining packet counts and
average timestamps for packet aggregates [13]. The “Secure
Sketch” technique from [10] enables Alice and Bob to detect
when the packets they exchange are lost, delayed, or modi-
fied beyond a certain level. All three protocols are relevant
to our work, in the sense that they measure network perfor-
mance, but, as explained in Section 2, none of them could
provide the properties necessary in our context.
Finally, Network Confessional can be viewed as a “per-
formance accountability mechanism,” which holds domains
accountable for their performance. An economic analysis
has showed that such a performance accountability mecha-
nism would foster ISP competition and innovation [14].
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented Network Confessional, a system by
which a network monitor can estimate the loss and delay
performance of network domains. Each participating do-
main produces receipts for a small sample of the packets
it observes. A domain cannot treat sampled packets pref-
erentially, because the sampling function is keyed on future
traffic, which means that a node learns whether it will have
to sample a packet, after it has forwarded the packet. More-
over, a domain cannot lie about what it did to each sampled
packet, because domains that are on the same path are ex-
pected to sample the same packets; as a result, to lie about
its performance with respect to a packet, a domain would
have to implicate one of its neighbors and be exposed to
that neighbor as a cheater. Running Network Confessional
does not require any form of coordination between different
network domains. Deployment comes at the cost of (mod-
est) new functionality at domain boundaries—the capability
to produce receipts, which requires computing simple hash
functions per observed packet. Producing these receipts re-
quires up to 4 SRAM chips per OC-192 network interface—
a reasonable requirement given that such interfaces already
come with hundreds of MB of expensive memory.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
We consider a period of time during which each of nodes
4 and 5 from Fig. 1 uses a constant buffer size and sampling
threshold; β is the smallest of the two buffer sizes used by
the two nodes, and σ is the smallest of the two sampling
thresholds.
A.1 Assumptions
We assume that packet loss and reordering are indepen-
dent and identically distributed Bernoulli processes, and that
reordering can only happen between packets that are ob-
served relatively close to one another.
More specifically, we assume that: (1) Each packet ob-
served at node 4 is lost between nodes 4 and 5 with proba-
bility λ, independently from any other packet. (2) A packet p
that is observed at node 4 between markers m1 and m2, and
is not lost between nodes 4 and 5, is reordered with either
m1 or m2 with probability ρ, independently from any other
packet. (3) Moreover, p can only be reordered with m1 or
m2, not with any other previous or future markers.
These is a simple model, and there is no guarantee that
it accurately describes Internet conditions. However, we are
not aware of any more sophisticated models that have been
shown to be more accurate, either. Note that we use this
model only to derive an estimate of the accuracy of our loss
estimation—it does not affect Network Confessional in any
other way.
A.2 Definitions
We define the following symbols:
Number of potentially sampled packets N . A packet p
counts toward N when: (i) p was observed at node 4 before
a marker m, which was also observed at node 5. (ii) The two
markers observed at node 4 right before and right after m
were also observed at node 5 in the same order. I.e., if node
4 observed packet sequence 〈mp, ...p, ...m, ...mn〉, node 5
observed packet sequence 〈mp, ...m, ...mn〉, where mp, m,
and mn are all markers. The reason for defining N in this
way will become apparent below.
Number of commonly sampled packets K. The number
of potentially sampled packets that are sampled by node 4,
and, unless they are lost or reordered with a marker, are also
sampled by node 5. A potentially sampled packet that is not
lost or reordered with a marker is sampled by both nodes
with probability pis, given by Eq. 1. Hence, K is a ran-
dom variable of binomial distribution, with expected value
E(K) = N pis.
Number of lost sampled packets kl. The number of com-
monly sampled packets that are lost between the two nodes
and, as a result, not sampled by node 5. More specifically, a
potentially sampled packet p belongs to this group of packets
when:
1. p is commonly sampled. The probability of this event
is pis.
2. p is lost between nodes 4 and 5. The probability of this
event is λ.
Given Assumption (1), kl is a random variable of binomial
distribution, with expected value E(kl) = N pis λ.
Number of downgraded packets kr. The number of com-
monly sampled packets that are reordered with a marker and,
as a result, not sampled by node 5. More specifically, a po-
tentially sampled packet p belongs to this group of packets
when:
1. p is observed at node 4 between markers m1 and m2
and is commonly sampled.
2. p is not lost between nodes 4 and 5.
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3. p is reordered with either m1 or m2 between nodes 4
and 5. The probability of this event is ρ.
4. p is not sampled by node 5.
Given Assumptions (1) and (2), kr is a random variable of
binomial distribution, with expected valueE(kr) = N pis pir,
where pir = (1− λ) ρ (1− pis).
Number of upgraded packets k¯r. The number of poten-
tially sampled packets that are not sampled by node 4, but,
due to packet reordering, are sampled by node 5. More
specifically, a potentially sampled packet p belongs to this
group of packets when:
1. p is observed at node 4 between markers m1 and m2
and is not commonly sampled.
2. p is not lost between nodes 4 and 5.
3. p is reordered with either m1 or m2 between nodes 4
and 5.
4. p is sampled by node 5.
Given Assumptions (1) and (2), k¯r is a random variable of
binomial distribution, with expected value E(k¯r) = N (1−
pis) pir, where pir = (1− λ) ρ pis.
Number of missed sampled packets k. These are the com-
monly sampled packets that are not sampled by node 5, ei-
ther because they are lost or because they are downgraded.
I.e., k = kl − kr.
Loss estimate λ∗. Of the above symbols, the receipt collec-
tor can compute K, k, and k¯r. It estimates λ as
λ∗ =
k − kl
K
At this point, we can explain whyN was defined as it was:
because that definition, in combination with Assumption (3),
enabled us to define kr and k¯r such that (i) they have the
same probability mass function, and (ii) the receipt collector
can compute k¯r. We clarify point (ii): Consider an upgraded
packet p that is sampled by node 5 based on a marker m; the
previous and next markers observed at node 5 are mp and
mn. To determine that p is an upgraded packet, the receipt
collector must first determine whether p is a potentially sam-
pled packet, i.e., whether p was observed at node 4 before a
marker m′ that was also observed at node 5. Since p was not
sampled by node 4, the receipt collector does not know be-
fore which marker pwas observed at node 4. However, given
Assumption (3), it knows that p was observed either before
mp or before mn at node 4; both of these packets were also
observed at node 5, hence, p is a potentially sampled packet.
A.3 Expected Value
The expected value of the estimate λ∗ is equal to:
E(λ∗) = E
(
k − k¯r
K
)
= E
(
kl + kr − k¯r
K
)
= E
(
kl
K
)
+ E
(
kr
K
)
− E
(
k¯r
K
)
. (4)
We first compute E
(
kl
K
)
:
E
(
kl
K
)
=
N∑
K=0
K∑
kl=0
kl
K
pmf(kl,K)
=
N∑
K=0
K∑
kl=0
kl
K
pmf(kl|K) · pmf(K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K
pmf(K)
K∑
kl=0
kl pmf(kl|K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K
pmf(K) · E(kl|K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K
pmf(K) ·K λ
=
N∑
K=0
pmf(K) · λ
= λ
N∑
K=0
pmf(K)
= λ. (5)
In a similar way, we can show that:
E
(
kr
K
)
= E
(
k¯r
K
)
= pir. (6)
Combining Eqs. 4, 5 and 6, we get:
E(λ∗) = λ. (7)
A.4 Relative Standard Deviation
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The variance of λ∗ is equal to:
V ar(λ∗) =
E((λ∗)2)− (E(λ∗))2 =
E
((
k − k¯r
K
)2)
− λ2 =
E
((
kl + kr − k¯r
K
)2)
− λ2 =
E
(
k2l + k
2
r + k¯r
2
+ 2kl − 2kl − 2kr
K2
)
− λ2 =
E
(
k2l
K2
)
+ E
(
k2r
K2
)
+ E
(
k¯r
2
K2
)
+ 2 E
(
kl kr
K2
)
− 2 E
(
kl k¯r
K2
)
− 2 E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
− λ2. (8)
We first compute E
(
k2l
K2
)
:
E
(
k2l
K2
)
=
N∑
K=0
K∑
kl=0
k2l
K2
pmf(K, kl)
=
N∑
K=0
K∑
kl=0
k2l
K2
pmf(kl|K) · pmf(K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K)
K∑
kl=0
k2l pmf(kl|K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K) E[kl
2|K]
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K)
(
Var [kl|K] + (E[kl|K])
2
)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K)
(
Var [kl|K] +
(
K · E
[
kl
K
|K
])2)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K)
(
Var [kl|K] +K
2λ2
)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K)
(
Kλ(1− λ) +K2λ2
)
= λ2
(
N∑
K=0
pmf(K)
)
+
λ(1− λ)
(
N∑
K=0
1
K
pmf(K)
)
= λ2 + λ(1− λ)
(
N∑
K=0
1
K
pmf(K)
)
= λ2 + λ(1− λ)E
[
1
K
]
= λ2 +
λ(1− λ)
E[K]
= λ2 +
λ(1− λ)
Npis
. (9)
In a similar way, we can show that:
E
(
k2r
K2
)
= E
(
k¯r
2
K2
)
= pi2r +
pir(1− pir)
Npis
. (10)
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Next, we compute E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
:
E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
=
N∑
K=0
K∑
kr=0
N−K∑
k¯r=0
kr k¯r
K2
pmf(K, kr, k¯r)
=
N∑
K=0
K∑
kr=0
N−K∑
k¯r=0
kr k¯r
K2
pmf(k¯r|kr,K) · pmf(kr|K) · pmf(K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K)
K∑
kr=0
kr pmf(kr|K)
N−K∑
k¯r=0
k¯r pmf(k¯r|kr,K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K) · E[kr|K]
N−K∑
k¯r=0
k¯r pmf(k¯r|kr,K)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K) · E[kr|K] · E[k¯r|kr,K]
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K) · E[kr|K] · E[k¯r|K] (because the underlying processes generating k¯r and kr are indep.)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K2
pmf(K) · (K pir) · ((N −K) pir)
=
N∑
K=0
1
K
pmf(K) · pir · ((N −K) pir)
= pir pir
N∑
K=0
N −K
K
pmf(K)
= pir pir
(
N∑
K=0
N
K
pmf(K)−
N∑
K=0
pmf(K)
)
= pir pir
(
N ·
N∑
K=0
1
K
pmf(K) − 1
)
= pir pir
(
N · E
[
1
K
]
− 1
)
= pir pir
(
N
E[K]
− 1
)
= pir pir
(
N
Npis
− 1
)
= pir · pir ·
1− pis
pis
= pir · (1− λ)ρpis ·
1− pis
pis
= pir · (1− λ)ρ(1− pis)
= pi2r . (11)
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In a similar way, we can show that:
E
(
kl kr
K2
)
= E
(
kl k¯r
K2
)
. (12)
To compute the relative standard deviation, we first have
Var(λ∗) = E
(
k2l
K2
)
+ E
(
k2r
K2
)
+ E
(
k¯r
2
K2
)
+ 2 E
(
kl kr
K2
)
− 2 E
(
kl k¯r
K2
)
− 2 E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
− λ2 (as per Eq. 8)
= E
(
k2l
K2
)
+ E
(
k2r
K2
)
+ E
(
k¯r
2
K2
)
− 2 E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
− λ2 (as per Eq. 12)
= λ2 +
λ(1− λ)
Npis
+ E
(
k2r
K2
)
+ E
(
k¯r
2
K2
)
− 2 E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
− λ2 (as per Eq. 9)
=
λ(1− λ)
Npis
+ E
(
k2r
K2
)
+ E
(
k¯r
2
K2
)
− 2 E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
=
λ(1− λ)
Npis
+ 2 ·
(
pi2r +
pir(1− pir)
Npis
)
− 2 E
(
kr k¯r
K2
)
(as per Eq. 10)
=
λ(1− λ)
Npis
+ 2 ·
(
pi2r +
pir(1− pir)
Npis
)
− 2pi2r (as per Eq. 11)
=
λ(1− λ)
Npis
+ 2 ·
(
pi2r +
pir(1− pir)
Npis
)
− 2pi2r
=
λ(1− λ)
Npis
+ 2 ·
pir(1− pir)
Npis
(13)
The relative standard deviation is therefore
σ(λ∗)
λ
=
√
Var(λ∗)
λ
=
√
Var(λ∗)
λ2
=√
1− λ
N pis λ
+
2 pir(1− pir)
N pis λ2
. (14)
Eqs. 7 and 14 prove Lemma 3.2.
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